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Abstract
For a set A of n people and a set B of m items, with each person having a preference
list that ranks some items in order of preference, we consider the problem of matching
every person with a unique item. A matching M is popular if for any other matching
M ′, the number of people who prefer M to M ′ is not less than the number of those who
prefer M ′ to M . For given n and m, consider the probability of existence of a popular
matching when each person’s preference list is independently and uniformly generated
at random. Previously, Mahdian showed that when people’s preference lists are strict
(containing no ties) and complete (containing all items in B), if α = m/n > α∗, where
α∗ ≈ 1.42 is the root of equation x2 = e1/x, then a popular matching exists with
probability 1 − o(1); and if α < α∗, then a popular matching exists with probability
o(1), i.e. a phase transition occurs at α∗. In this paper, we investigate phase transitions
in more general cases when people’s preference lists are not complete. In particular, we
show that in the case that each person has a preference list of length k, if α > αk, where
αk ≥ 1 is the root of equation xe−1/2x = 1− (1− e−1/x)k−1, then a popular matching
exists with probability 1 − o(1); and if α < αk, then a popular matching exists with
probability o(1).
Keywords: popular matching, incomplete preference lists, phase transition, com-
plex component
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of matching people with items, with each person having a preference
list that ranks some items in order of preference. This simple problem models many impor-
tant real-world situations, such as the assignment of DVDs to subscribers [13], graduates
to training positions [9], and families to government-subsidized housing [19].
The main target of such problems is to find the “optimal” matching in each situation.
Various definitions of optimality have been proposed. The least restrictive one is Pareto
optimality [1, 2, 17]. A matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching M ′
such that at least one person prefers M ′ to M but no one prefers M to M ′. Other stronger
definitions include rank-maximality [10] (allocating maximum number of people to their
first choices, then maximum number to their second choices, and so on), and popularity
[3, 7] defined below.
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1.1 Popular Matching
Consider a set A of n people and a set B of m items, with α = m/n. Throughout this
paper, we assume that m ≥ n and thus α ≥ 1. Each person has a preference list that ranks
some items in order of preference. A preference list is strict if it does not contain ties, and
is complete if it contains all items in B. We want to match every person with a unique item.
In a matching M , for each person a ∈ A and item b ∈ B, let M(a) be an item matched
with a, and M(b) be a person matched with b (for convenience, let M(a) be null for an
unmatched person a).
Let ra(b) be the rank of item b in a’s preference list, with the most preferred item
having rank 1, the second most preferred item having rank 2, and so on (for convenience, let
ra(null) =∞). For any pair of matchings M and M ′, we define φ(M,M ′) to be the number
of people who prefer M to M ′, i.e. φ(M,M ′) = |{a ∈ A|ra(M(a)) < ra(M ′(a))}|. We then
define a matching M to win over a matching M ′ (and M ′ to lose to M) if there are more
people who prefer M to M ′ than those who prefer M ′ to M , i.e. φ(M,M ′) > φ(M ′,M).
A popular matching is a matching that does not lose to any other matching. A popular
matching may or may not exist, depending on the people’s preference lists.
A probabilistic variant of this problem, the random popular matching problem, studies
the probability that a popular matching exists in a random instance for each value of n and
m, when each person’s preference list is defined independently by selecting the first item
b1 ∈ B uniformly at random, the second item b2 ∈ B \ {b1} uniformly at random, the third
item b3 ∈ B \ {b1, b2} uniformly at random, and so on.
1.2 Related Work
The concept of popularity of a matching was first introduced by Gardenfors [7] in the con-
text of the stable marriage problem. Abraham et al. [3] presented the first polynomial time
algorithm to find a popular matching in a given instance, or to report that none exists. The
algorithm runs in O(m+n) time when the preference lists contain no ties, and in O(m
√
n)
time when the preference lists contain ties. Later, Mestre [16] generalized the algorithm to
find a popular matching in the case that people are given different voting weights. That
algorithm runs in O(m+ n) time when ties are not allowed, and in O(min(k
√
n, n)m) time
when ties are allowed, where k is the number of distinct weights. A variant of this problem
known as the capacitated house allocation problem allows an item to be matched with more
than one person. Manlove and Sng [14] presented an algorithm to determine whether a pop-
ular matching exists in this setting. The algorithm runs in O(
√
Cn+L) time when ties are
not allowed, and in O((
√
C+n)L) time when ties are allowed, where C is the total capacity
and L is the total length of people’s preference lists. The notion of a popular matching also
applies when the preference lists are two-sided (matching people with people), both in the
bipartite graph (marriage problem) and non-bipartite graph (roommates problem). Biro´ et
al. [5] developed an algorithm to test popularity of a matching in these two settings and
proved that determining whether a popular matching exists in these settings is an NP-hard
problem when ties are allowed.
While a popular matching does not always exist, McCutchen [15] introduced two mea-
sures of the unpopularity of a matching, the unpopularity factor and the unpopularity
margin, and showed that the problem of finding a matching that minimizes either measure
is an NP-hard problem. Huang et al. [8] later gave algorithms to find a matching with
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bounded values of these measures in certain instances. Kavitha et al. [12] introduced the
concept of a mixed matching, which is a probability distribution over matchings, and proved
that a mixed matching that is popular always exists.
For the probabilistic variant of strict and complete preference lists, Mahdian [13] proved
that if α = m/n > α∗, where α∗ ≈ 1.42 is the root of equation x2 = e1/x, then a popular
matching exists with high probability (1− o(1) probability) in a random instance. On the
other hand, if α < α∗, a popular matching exists with low probability (o(1) probability).
The point α = α∗ can be regarded as a phase transition point, at which the probability rises
from asymptotically zero to asymptotically one. Itoh and Watanabe [11] later studied the
case when people are given two weights w1, w2 with w1 ≥ 2w2, and found a phase transition
at α = Θ(n1/3).
1.3 Our Results
The probabilistic variant in the case that preference lists are not complete, with every per-
son’s preference list having the same length k, was mentioned and conjectured by Mahdian
[13] and simulated by Abraham et al. [3], but the exact phase transition point, or whether it
exists at all, had not been found yet. In this paper, we study that case and discover a phase
transition at α = αk, where αk ≥ 1 is the root of equation xe−1/2x = 1 − (1 − e−1/x)k−1.
In particular, we prove that for k ≥ 4, if α > αk, then a popular matching exists with high
probability; and if α < αk, then a popular matching exists with low probability. For k ≤ 3,
in which the equation does not have a solution in [1,∞), a popular matching always exists
with high probability for every value of α ≥ 1.
2 Preliminaries
For convenience, we create a unique auxiliary last resort item `a for each person a ∈ A
and append `a to the end of a’s preference list, i.e. `a has lower preference than all other
items in the list. By introducing the last resort items, we can assume that every person is
matched because we can simply match any unmatched person a with `a. Note that these
last resort items are not in B and do not count toward m, the total number of “real items.”
For each person a ∈ A, let f(a) be the item at the top of a’s preference list. Let
F be the set of items b ∈ B such that there exists a person a′ ∈ A with f(a′) = b, and
let S = B − F . Then, for each person a ∈ A, let s(a) be the highest ranked item in a’s
preference list that is not in F . Note that s(a) is well-defined for every a ∈ A because of
the existence of last resort items.
Definition 1. A matching M is A-perfect if every person a ∈ A is matched with either
f(a) or s(a).
Abraham et al. proved the following lemma, which holds for any instance with strict
(not necessarily complete) preference lists.
Lemma 2. [3] In a given instance with strict preference lists, a popular matching exists if
and only if an A-perfect matching exists.
It is worth noting a simple but useful lemma about independent and uniform selection
of items at random proved by Mahdian, which will be used throughout this paper.
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Lemma 3. [13] Suppose that we pick y elements from the set {1, ..., z} independently
and uniformly at random (with replacement). Let a random variable X be the number of
elements in the set that are not picked. Then, E[X] = e−y/zz −Θ(1) and Var[X] < E[X].
3 Complete Preference Lists Setting
We first consider the setting that every person’s preference list is strict and complete. Note
that when m > n and the preference lists are complete, the last resort items are not
necessary.
From a given instance, we construct a top-choice graph, a bipartite graph with parts
B and S such that each person a ∈ A corresponds to an edge connecting f(a) ∈ B and
s(a) ∈ S. Note that multiple edges are allowed in this graph. Previously, Mahdian proved
the following lemma.
Lemma 4. [13] In a given instance with strict and complete preference lists, an A-perfect
matching exists if and only if its top-choice graph does not contain a complex component,
i.e. a connected component with more than one cycle.
By Lemmas 2 and 4, the problem of determining whether a popular matching exists
is equivalent to determining whether the top-choice graph contains a complex component.
However, the difficulty is that the number of vertices in the randomly generated top-choice
graph is not fixed. Therefore, a random bipartite graph G(x, y, z) with fixed number of
vertices is defined as follows to approximate the top-choice graph.
Definition 5. For integers x, y, z, G(x, y, z) is a bipartite graph with V ∪ U as a set of
vertices, where V = {v1, v2, ..., vx} and U = {u1, u2, ..., uy}. Each of the z edges of G(x, y, z)
is selected independently and uniformly at random (with replacement) from the set of all
possible edges between a vertice in V and a vertice in U .
This auxiliary graph has properties closely related to the top-choice graph. Mahdian
then proved that if α > α∗ ≈ 1.42, then G(m,h, n) contains a complex component with
low probability for a range of values of h, and used those properties to conclude that the
top-choice graph also contains a complex component with low probability, thus a popular
matching exists with high probability.
Theorem 6. [13] In a random instance with strict and complete preference lists, if α > α∗,
where α∗ ≈ 1.42 is the solution of the equation x2e−1/x = 1, then a popular matching exists
with probability 1− o(1).
Theorem 6 serves as an upper bound of the phase transition point in the case of strict
and complete preference lists. On the other hand, the following lower bound was also
proposed by Mahdian along with a sketch of the proof, although the fully detailed proof
was not given.
Theorem 7. [13] In a random instance with strict and complete preference lists, if α < α∗,
then a popular matching exists with probability o(1).
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4 Incomplete Preference Lists Setting
The previous section shows known results in the setting that preference lists are strict and
complete. However, preference lists in many real-world situations are not complete, as
people may regard only some items as acceptable for them.
In the setting that the preference lists are strict but not complete, we will consider
the case that every person’s preference list has equal length k (not counting the last resort
item).
Definition 8. For a positive integer k ≤ m, an instance with k-incomplete preference lists
is an instance with every person’s preference list having length exactly k.
Definition 9. For a positive integer k ≤ m, a random instance with strict and k-incomplete
preference lists is an instance with each person’s preference list is chosen independently and
uniformly from the set of all m!(m−k)! possible k-permutations of the m items in B at random.
Recall that F = {b ∈ B|∃a′ ∈ A, f(a′) = b} and for each person a ∈ A, s(a) is the
highest ranked item in a’s preference list not in F . The main difference from the complete
preference lists setting is that, in the incomplete preference lists setting s(a) can be either a
real item or the last-resort item `a. For each person a ∈ A, let Pa be the set of items in a’s
preference list (not including the last resort item `a). We then define A1 = {a ∈ A|Pa ⊆ F}
and A2 = {a ∈ A|Pa * F}. We have s(a) = `a if and only if a ∈ A1.
4.1 Top-Choice Graph
Analogously to the complete preference lists setting, we define the top-choice graph of an
instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists to be a bipartite graph with parts
B and S ∪ L, where L = {`a|a ∈ A} is the set of last resort items. Each person a ∈ A2
corresponds to an edge connecting f(a) ∈ B and s(a) ∈ S. We call these edges normal
edges. Each person a ∈ A1 corresponds to an edge connecting f(a) ∈ B and s(a) = `a ∈ L.
We call these edges last resort edges.
Although the statement of Lemma 4 proved by Mahdian [13] is for the complete pref-
erence lists setting, exactly the same proof applies to incomplete preference lists setting as
well. The proof first shows that an A-perfect matching exists if and only if each edge in
the top-choice graph can be oriented such that each vertex has at most one incoming edge
(because if an A-perfect matching M exists, we can orient each edge corresponding to a ∈ A
toward the endpoint corresponding to M(a), and vice versa). Then, the proof shows that
for any top-choice graph H, each edge of H can be oriented in such manner if and only if
H does not have a complex component. Thus we can conclude the following lemma.
Lemma 10. In a given instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists, an A-perfect
matching exists if and only if its top-choice graph does not contain a complex component.
In contrast to the complete preference lists setting, the top-choice graph in the incom-
plete preference lists setting has two types of edges with different distributions: normal
edges and last resort edges, and cannot be approximated by G(x, y, z) defined in the pre-
vious section. Therefore, we have to construct another auxiliary graph G′(x, y, z1, z2) as
follows.
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Definition 11. For integers x, y, z1, z2, G
′(x, y, z1, z2) is a bipartite graph with V ∪U∪U ′ as
a set of vertices, where V = {v1, v2, ..., vx}, U = {u1, u2, ..., uy}, and U ′ = {u′1, u′2, ..., u′z1+z2}.
This graph has z1 + z2 edges. Each of the first z1 edges is selected independently and uni-
formly at random (with replacement) from the set of all possible edges between a vertice
in V and a vertice in U . Then, each of the next z2 edges is constructed by the following
procedures: Uniformly select a vertex vi from V at random (with replacement); then, uni-
formly select a vertex u′j that has not been selected before from U
′ at random (without
replacement) and construct an edge (vi, u
′
j).
The intuition of G′(x, y, z1, z2) is that we approximate the top-choice graph in the
incomplete preference list setting, with V , U , and U ′ correspond to B, S, and L, respectively,
and the first z1 edges and the next z2 edges correspond to normal edges and last resort edges,
respectively.
Similarly to the complete preference lists setting, this auxiliary graph has properties
closely related to the top-choice graph in incomplete preference lists setting, as shown in
the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Suppose that α = m/n, the top-choice graph H has t normal edges and n− t
last resort edges for a fixed integer t ≤ n, and E is an arbitrary event defined on graphs. If
the probability of E on the random graph G′(m,h, t, n− t) is at most O(1/n) for every fixed
integer h ∈ [e−1/αm −m2/3, e−1/αm + m2/3], then the probability of E on the top-choice
graph H is at most O(n−1/3).
Proof. Using the same technique as in Mahdian’s proof of [13, Lemma 3], let a random
variable X be the number of isolated vertices (zero-degree vertices) in part V (the part that
has m vertices) of G′(m,h, t, n− t). By definition, for each fixed value of h, the distribution
of H conditioned on |S| = h is the same as the distribution of G′(m,h, t, n− t) conditioned
on X = h. From Lemma 3, with y = n and z = m, we have E[X] = e−1/αm − Θ(1)
and Var[X] < E[X]. Let δ = 12m
2/3, and let I = [E[X] − δ, E[X] + δ]. We have I ⊆
[e−1/αm−m2/3, e−1/αm+m2/3]. So,
Pr
H
[E] =
∑
h
Pr
H
[
E
∣∣|S| = h] · Pr
H
[|S| = h]
=
∑
h
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E|X = h] · Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[X = h]
=
∑
h
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[X = h|E] · Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E]
≤ Pr[|X − E[X]| > δ] +
∑
h∈I
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[X = h|E] · Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E]
≤ Pr[|X − E[X]| > δ] +
∑
h∈I
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E].
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From Chebyshev’s inequality, we have
Pr
H
[E] ≤ Var[X]
δ2
+
∑
h∈I
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E]
≤ E[X]
δ2
+ 2δmax
h∈I
Pr
G′(m,h,t,n−t)
[E]
<
O(m)
m4/3
+m2/3O
(
1
n
)
= O(n−1/3)
as desired.
4.2 Size of A2
Since our top-choice graph has two types of edges with different distributions, the first thing
we want to bound is the number of each type of edges. Note that the top-choice graph has
|A2| normal edges and |A1| last resort edges, so the problem is equivalent to bounding the
size of A2.
We will prove the following lemma, which shows that in a random instance with strict
and k-incomplete preference lists, the ratio |A2|n lies around a constant 1 − (1 − e−1/α)k−1
with high probability.
Lemma 13. In a random instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists,
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c < |A2|
n
< 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
with probability 1− o(1) for any constant c > 0.
Proof. Let c > 0 be any constant. If k = 1, then we have Pa ⊆ F for every a ∈ A, which
means |A2| = 0 and thus the lemma holds. From now on, we will consider the case that
k ≥ 2.
From Lemma 3, with y = n and z = m, we have
E[|F |] = m− E[|S|] = (1− e−1/α)m+ Θ(1);
Var(|F |) = Var(|S|) < E[|S|] < c1E[|F |],
for some constant c1 > 0. Let c
′ = c(k−1)(c+4) . By bounding the binomial expansions, we
can verify that
(1− e−1/α − c′)k−1 > (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
4
; (1)
(1− e−1/α + c′)k−1 < (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
4
, (2)
where the proof is given in Appendix A. Also, from Chebyshev’s inequality we have
Pr
[∣∣|F | − E[|F |]∣∣ ≥ c′ · E[|F |]] ≤ Var[|F |]
(c′ · E[|F |])2 ≤
c1
c′2 · E[|F |] = O(1/n). (3)
Let I = [(1 − e−1/α − c′)m, (1 − e−1/α + c′)m]. From (3) and the fact that E[|F |] =
(1− e−1/α)m+ Θ(1), we have |F | ∈ I with probability 1−O(1/n) = 1− o(1) for sufficiently
large m.
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Now suppose that |F | = q for some fixed integer q ∈ I. For each a ∈ A, we have a ∈ A1
if and only if Pa − {f(a)} ⊆ F . Consider that we first independently and uniformly select
the first-choice item of every person in A from the set B at random, creating the set F .
Then, for each a ∈ A, we uniformly select the remaining k−1 items in a’s preference list one
by one from the remaining m− 1 items in B−{f(a)} at random. Among the (k− 1)!(m−1k−1)
possible ways of selection, there are (k − 1)!(q−1k−1) ways such that Pa − {f(a)} ⊆ F , so
Pr
[
a ∈ A1
∣∣|F | = q] = Pr [Pa − {f(a)} ⊆ F ∣∣|F | = q]
=
(k − 1)!(q−1k−1)
(k − 1)!(m−1k−1)
=
(
q−1
k−1
)(
m−1
k−1
) .
Since
(
q−1
k−1
)
/
(
m−1
k−1
)
converges to
( q
m
)k−1
when m becomes very large for every q ∈ I, it
is sufficient to consider Pr
[
a ∈ A1
∣∣|F | = q] = ( qm)k−1. Using this with (1) and (2), we can
prove that
(1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
2
< Pr[a ∈ A1] < (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
2
,
where the detailed proof is given in Appendix B. This is equivalent to
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
2
< Pr[a ∈ A2] < 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
2
.
Finally, from this we can bound the expected value and variance of |A2|, and use
Chebyshev’s inequality to prove that
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c < |A2|
n
< 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
with probability 1− o(1), where the detailed proof is given in Appendix C.
5 Main Results
For each value of k, we want to find a phase transition point αk such that if α > αk, then a
popular matching exists with high probability; and if α < αk, then a popular matching exists
with low probability. We do so by proving the upper bound and lower bound separately.
5.1 Upper Bound
Lemma 14. Suppose that α = m/n and 0 ≤ β < αe−1/2α. Then, the probability that
G′(m,h, βn, (1 − β)n) contains a complex component is at most O(1/n) for every fixed
integer h ∈ [e−1/αm−m2/3, e−1/αm+m2/3].
Proof. By the definition of G′(m,h, βn, (1 − β)n), each vertex in U ′ has degree at most
one, thus removing U ′ does not affect the existence of a complex component. Moreover,
the graph G′(m,h, βn, (1 − β)n) with part U ′ removed has exactly the same distribution
as G(m,h, βn) defined in Definition 5. Therefore, it is sufficient to consider the graph
G(m,h, βn) instead.
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Using the same technique as in Mahdian’s proof of [13, Lemma 4], let X and Y be
subsets of vertices of G(m,h, βn) in V and U , respectively. Define BADX,Y to be an event
that X ∪ Y contains either two vertices joined by three disjoint paths or two disjoint cycles
joined by a path as a spanning subgraph. We call such subgraphs bad subgraphs. Note
that every graph that contains a complex component must contain a bad subgraph. Then,
let p1 = |X|, p2 = |Y |, and p = p1 + p2. Observe that BADX,Y can occur only when
|p1 − p2| ≤ 1, so p1, p2 ≥ p−12 . Also, there are at most 2p2 non-isomorphic bad graphs with
p1 vertices in V and p2 vertices in U , with each of them having p1!p2! ways to arrange the
vertices, and there are at most (p+1)!
(
βn
p+1
) (
1
mh
)p+1
probability that all p+1 edges of each
graph are selected in our random procedure. So, the probability of BADX,Y is at most
2p2p1!p2!(p+ 1)!
(
βn
p+ 1
)(
1
mh
)p+1
≤ 2p2p1!p2!
(
βn
mh
)p+1
.
By union bound, the probability that at least one BADX,Y occurs is at most
Pr
∨
X,Y
BADX,Y
 ≤ ∑
p1,p2
(
m
p1
)(
h
p2
)
2p2p1!p2!
(
βn
mh
)p+1
≤
∑
p1,p2
mp1
p1!
· h
p2
p2!
· 2p2p1!p2!
(
β
αh
)p+1
=
∑
p1,p2
2p2
h
(
β
α
)p+1 (m
h
)p1
≤
∞∑
p=1
O(p2)
n
(
β
α
)p (
e−1/α −m−1/3
)−p/2
=
O(1)
n
∞∑
p=1
p2
(
α2
β2
(
e−1/α −m−1/3
))−p/2
.
By the assumption, we have α2e−1/α > β2, so α
2
β2
(e−1/α −m−1/3) > 1 for sufficiently
large m, thus the above sum converges. Therefore, the probability that at least one BADX,Y
happens is at most O(1/n).
We can now prove the following theorem as an upper bound of αk.
Theorem 15. In a random instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists, if αe−1/2α >
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1, then a popular matching exists with probability 1− o(1).
Proof. Since αe−1/2α > 1 − (1 − e−1/α)k−1, we can select a small enough δ1 > 0 such
that αe−1/2α > 1 − (1 − e−1/α)k−1 + δ1. Let J1 = [(1 − (1 − e−1/α)k−1 − δ1)n, (1 − (1 −
e−1/α)k−1 + δ1)n]. From Lemma 13, |A2| ∈ J1 with probability 1− o(1). Moreover, we have
β = tn < αe
−1/2α for any integer t ∈ J1.
Define E1 to be an event that a popular matching exists in a random instance. First,
consider the probability of E1 conditioned on |A2| = t for each fixed integer t ∈ J1. By
Lemmas 12 and 14, the top-choice graph contains a complex component with probability
O(n−1/3) = o(1). Therefore, from Lemmas 2 and 10 we can conclude that a popular
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matching exists with probability 1 − o(1), i.e. Pr [E1∣∣|A2| = t] = 1 − o(1) for every fixed
integer t ∈ J1. So
Pr[E1] =
∑
t
Pr[|A2| = t] · Pr
[
E1
∣∣|A2| = t]
≥
∑
t∈J1
Pr[|A2| = t] · Pr
[
E1
∣∣|A2| = t]
≥ Pr[|A2| ∈ J1] · (1− o(1))
= (1− o(1))(1− o(1))
= 1− o(1).
Thus a popular matching exists with probability 1− o(1).
5.2 Lower Bound
Lemma 16. Suppose that α = m/n and αe−1/2α < β ≤ 1. Then, the probability that
G′(m,h, βn, (1 − β)n) does not contain a complex component is at most O(1/n) for every
fixed integer h ∈ [e−1/αm−m2/3, e−1/αm+m2/3].
Proof. Again, by the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 14, we can consider the
graph G(m,h, βn) instead of G′(m,h, βn, (1− β)n), but now we are interested in an event
that G(m,h, βn) does not contain a complex component.
Since αe−1/2α < β, for sufficiently small  > 0, we still have αe−1/2α < (1 − )3/2β.
Consider the random bipartite graph G(m,h, (1 − )βn) with parts V having m vertices
and U having h vertices. For each vertex v, let a random variable rv be the degree of v.
Since there are (1 − )βn edges in the graph, the expected value of rv for each v ∈ V is
c1 =
(1−)βn
m =
(1−)β
α . Since e
−1/αm+m2/3 < e
−1/αm
1− for sufficiently large m, the expected
value of rv for each v ∈ U is
c2 =
(1− )βn
h
>
(1− )βn
e−1/αm+m2/3
>
(1− )βn
e−1/αm/(1− ) =
(1− )2β
αe−1/α
for sufficiently largem. Furthermore, each rv has a binomial distribution, which converges to
Poisson distribution when m becomes very large. The graph can be viewed as a special case
of an inhomogeneous random graph [6, 18]. With the assumption that c1c2 >
(1−)3β2
α2e−1/α > 1,
we can conclude that the graph contains a giant component (a component containing a
constant fraction of vertices of the entire graph) with probability 1 − O(1/n), where the
explanation is given in Appendix D.
Finally, consider the construction of G(m,h, βn) by putting βn more random edges
into G(m,h, (1 − )βn). If two of those edges land in the giant component C, a complex
component will be created. Since C has size of a constant fraction of m, each edge has a
constant probability to land in C, so the probability that at most one edge will land in C
is exponentially low. Therefore, G(m,h, βn) does not contain a complex component with
probability at most O(1/n).
We can now prove the following theorem as a lower bound of αk.
Theorem 17. In a random instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists, if αe−1/2α <
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1, then a popular matching exists with probability o(1).
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Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 15, we can select a small enough δ2 > 0 such that
αe−1/2α < 1−(1−e−1/α)k−1−δ2. Let J2 = [(1−(1−e−1/α)k−1−δ2)n, (1−(1−e−1/α)k−1+
δ2)n]. We have
|A2|
n ∈ J2 with probability 1 − o(1) and β = tn > αe−1/2α for any integer
t ∈ J2.
Now we define E2 to be an event that a popular matching does not exist in a ran-
dom instance. By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 15, we can prove that
Pr
[
E2
∣∣|A2| = t] = 1 − o(1) for every fixed t ∈ J2 and reach an analogous conclusion that
Pr[E2] = 1− o(1).
5.3 Phase Transition
Since f(x) = xe−1/2x − (1 − (1 − e−1/x)k−1) is an increasing function in [1,∞) for every
k ≥ 1, f(x) = 0 can have at most one root in [1,∞). That root, if exists, will serve as a
phase transition point αk. In fact, for k ≥ 4, f(x) = 0 has a unique solution in [1,∞); for
k ≤ 3, f(x) = 0 has no solution in [1,∞) and αe−1/2α > 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 for every α ≥ 1,
so a popular matching always exists with high probability regardless of value of α without
a phase transition. Therefore, from Theorems 15 and 17 we can conclude our main theorem
below.
Theorem 18. In a random instance with strict and k-incomplete preference lists with
k ≥ 4, if α > αk, where αk ≥ 1 is the root of equation xe−1/2x = 1− (1− e−1/x)k−1, then a
popular matching exists with probability 1− o(1); and if α < αk, then a popular matching
exists with probability o(1). For k ≤ 3, a popular matching always exists with probability
1− o(1) in a random instance with k-incomplete preference lists for every α ≥ 1.
5.4 Discussion
For each value of k ≥ 4, the phase transition occurs at the root αk ≥ 1 of equation
xe−1/2x = 1− (1− e−1/x)k−1 as shown in Figure 1. Note that as k increases, the right-hand
side of the equation converges to 1, thus αk converges to Mahdian’s value of α∗ ≈ 1.42 in
the case with complete preference lists.
Figure 1: Solution in [1,∞) of the equation xe−1/2x = 1− (1− e−1/x)k−1
for each k ≥ 4, with the dashed line plotting x = α∗ ≈ 1.42
Remark: For each person a, as the length of Pa increases, the probability that Pa * F
and thus a ∈ A2 also increases, and so do the expected size of A2 and the phase transition
point. Therefore, in the case that the lengths of people’s preference lists are fixed but not
equal (e.g. half of the people have preference lists with length k1, and another half have
11
those with length k2), the phase transition will occur between αkmin and αkmax , where kmin
and kmax are the shortest and longest lengths of people’s preference lists, respectively.
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A Proof of Inequalities (1) and (2)
For k ≥ 2, let c′ = c(k−1)(c+4) and p = 1− e−1/α. We have 0 < p < 1 and 0 < c′ < 1. So,
(p− c′)k−1 = pk−1 −
(
k − 1
1
)
pk−2c′ +
(
k − 1
2
)
pk−3c′2 − · · ·+ (−1)k−1
(
k − 1
k − 1
)
c′k−1
≥ pk−1 −
[
(k − 1)c′ + (k − 1)2c′2 + · · ·+ (k − 1)k−1c′k−1
]
= pk−1 −
[
c
c+ 4
+
(
c
c+ 4
)2
+ · · ·+
(
c
c+ 4
)k−1]
> pk−1 −
[
c
c+ 4
+
(
c
c+ 4
)2
+ · · ·
]
= pk−1 −
c
c+4
1− cc+4
= pk−1 − c
4
.
Therefore (1− e−1/α − c′)k−1 > (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c4 . Also, we have
(p+ c′)k−1 = pk−1 +
(
k − 1
1
)
pk−2c′ +
(
k − 1
2
)
pk−3c′2 + · · ·+
(
k − 1
k − 1
)
c′k−1
≤ pk−1 + (k − 1)c′ + (k − 1)2c′2 + · · ·+ (k − 1)k−1c′k−1
= pk−1 +
c
c+ 4
+
(
c
c+ 4
)2
+ · · ·+
(
c
c+ 4
)k−1
< pk−1 +
c
c+ 4
+
(
c
c+ 4
)2
+ · · ·
= pk−1 +
c
c+4
1− cc+4
= pk−1 +
c
4
.
Therefore (1− e−1/α + c′)k−1 < (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c4 .
B Upper and Lower Bounds of Pr[a ∈ A1]
Consider Pr[a ∈ A1]. We have
Pr[a ∈ A1] =
∑
q
Pr[|F | = q] · Pr [a ∈ A1∣∣|F | = q]
=
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · Pr [a ∈ A1∣∣|F | = q]+∑
q /∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · Pr [a ∈ A1∣∣|F | = q] .
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For the lower bound of Pr[a ∈ A1], we have
Pr[a ∈ A1] ≥
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · Pr [a ∈ A1∣∣|F | = q]
=
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] ·
( q
m
)k−1
≥
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · (1− e−1/α − c′)k−1
= Pr[|F | ∈ I] · (1− e−1/α − c′)k−1
> (1− o(1))((1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
4
),
where the last inequality follows from (1). Therefore, we can conclude that Pr[a ∈ A1] >
(1 − e−1/α)k−1 − c2 for sufficiently large m. On the other hand, for the upper bound of
Pr[a ∈ A1], we have
Pr[a ∈ A1] ≤
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · Pr [a ∈ A1∣∣|F | = q]+∑
q /∈I
Pr[|F | = q]
=
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] ·
( q
m
)k−1
+ o(1)
≤
∑
q∈I
Pr[|F | = q] · (1− e−1/α + c′)k−1 + o(1)
= Pr[|F | ∈ I] · (1− e−1/α + c′)k−1 + o(1)
< (1− o(1))((1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
4
) + o(1),
where the last inequality follows from (2). Therefore, we can conclude that Pr[a ∈ A1] <
(1− e−1/α)k−1 + c2 for sufficiently large m.
C Upper and Lower Bounds of |A2|
Assume that
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
2
< Pr[a ∈ A2] < 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
2
(4)
holds for sufficiently large m. For each a ∈ A, define an indicator random variable Xa such
that
Xa =
{
1, for a ∈ A2;
0, for a /∈ A2.
Note that |A2| =
∑
a∈AXa. From (4), we have
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
2
< Pr[Xa = 1] < 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
2
for each a ∈ A, and from the linearity of expectiation we also have(
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c
2
)
n < E[|A2|] <
(
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
2
)
n. (5)
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Since Var[|A2|] = E[|A2|2]− E[|A2|]2, we evaluate E[|A2|2] and E[|A2|]2 as follows:
E[|A2|2] = E
(∑
a∈A
Xa
)2
= E
∑
a
X2a +
∑
a6=b
XaXb

=
∑
a
E[Xa] +
∑
a6=b
E[XaXb]
=
∑
a
Pr[Xa = 1] +
∑
a6=b
Pr[Xa = 1 ∧Xb = 1]
=
∑
a
Pr[Xa = 1] +
∑
a6=b
Pr[Xa = 1] Pr[Xb = 1]; (6)
E[|A2|]2 = E
[∑
a
Xa
]
· E
[∑
b
Xb
]
=
(∑
a
E[Xa]
)(∑
b
E[Xb]
)
=
(∑
a
Pr[Xa = 1]
)(∑
b
Pr[Xb = 1]
)
=
∑
a
(Pr[Xa = 1])
2 +
∑
a6=b
Pr[Xa = 1] Pr[Xb = 1], (7)
where (6) follows from the fact that Xa and Xb are independent for any pair of distinct
a, b ∈ A. From (6) and (7), it follows that
Var[|A2|] = E[|A2|2]− E[|A2|]2
=
∑
a
Pr[Xa = 1]−
∑
a
(Pr[Xa = 1])
2
≤
∑
a
Pr[Xa = 1]
=
∑
a
E[Xa]
= E[A2].
Then, from Chebyshev’s inequality and (5) we have
Pr
[∣∣|A2| − E[|A2|]∣∣ ≥ c
2
· E[|A2|]
]
≤ Var[|A2|](
c
2 · E[|A2|]
)2 ≤ 1c2
4 · E[|A2|]
= O(1/n).
This implies (1− c2)E[|A2|] ≤ |A2| ≤ (1 + c2)E[|A2|] with probability 1−O(1/n) = 1− o(1).
Therefore, from (5) we can conclude that
1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 − c < |A2|
n
< 1− (1− e−1/α)k−1 + c
with probability 1− o(1).
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D Explanation of the Lower Bound
An inhomogeneous random graph is a generalization of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph, where vertices
of the graph are divided into several (finite or infinite) types. Each vertex of type i has κij
expected neighbors of type j.
The graph G(m,h, (1− )βn) can be considered as a special case of the inhomogeneous
random graph where there are two types of vertices, with κ11 = 0, κ12 = c1, κ21 = c2,
and κ22 = 0. It has an offspring matrix Tκ = {κij}2i,j=1 =
(
0 c1
c2 0
)
, which has the largest
eigenvalue ||Tκ|| = √c1c2 > 1. This is a necessary and sufficient condition to conclude that
G(m,h, (1 − )βn) contains a giant component with 1 − o(1) probability [6, 18]. In fact,
by giving a precise bound in each step of [6], it is possible to show that the probability is
greater than 1−O(1/n) as desired.
Alternatively, we can directly prove the bipartite case by approximating the construc-
tion of the graph with a Galton-Watson branching process similar to that in the proof of
existence of a giant component in the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graph in [4, pp.182-192].
The Galton-Watson branching process is a process that generates a random graph in
a breadth-first search tree manner when given a starting vertex and a distribution of the
degree of each vertex. The process starts when the starting vertex spawns a number of
children which are put in the queue in some order. Then, the first vertex in the queue also
spawns children which are put at the end of the queue by the same manner, and so on.
The process may stop at some point when the queue becomes empty, or otherwise continues
indefinitely.
Consider the construction of G(m,h, (1−)βn) with parts V and U starting at a vertex
and discovering new vertices in a breadth-first search tree manner. We approximate it with
the Galton-Watson branching process. Let T be the size of the process (T = ∞ if the
process continues forever). Let z1 and z2 be the probability that T <∞ when starting the
process at a vertex in V and U , respectively. Also, let Z1 and Z2 be the number of children
the root has when starting the process at a vertex in V and U , respectively.
Given that the root has i children, in order for the branching process to be finite, all
of the i branches must be finite, so we get the equations.
z1 =
∞∑
i=0
Pr[Z1 = i]z
i
2;
z2 =
∞∑
i=0
Pr[Z2 = i]z
i
1.
Therefore,
z1 =
∞∑
i=0
ci1e
−c1
i!
 ∞∑
j=0
cj2e
−c2zj1
j!
i = ∞∑
i=0
ci1e
−c1
i!
ec2(z1−1)i = ec1(e
c2(z1−1)−1).
Setting y = 1− z1 yields the equation
1− y = ec1(e−c2y−1). (8)
Define g(y) = 1 − y − ec1(e−c2y−1). We have g(0) = 1 − 0 − 1 = 0, g(1) < 0, and
g′(0) = c1c2 − 1. By the assumption that c1c2 > 1, we have g′(0) > 0, so there must be
y ∈ (0, 1) such that g(y) = 0, thus being a solution of (8).
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So, Pr[T =∞] = y ∈ (0, 1), when y is a solution of (8), meaning that there is a constant
probability that the process continues indefinitely.
Moreover, from the property of Poisson distribution we can show that Pr[x < T <
∞] is exponentially low in term of x. Therefore, we can select a constant k1 such that
Pr[k1 log n < T <∞] < O(1/n2).
Finally, when we perform the Galton-Watson branching process at a vertex inG(m,h, (1−
)βn), there is a constant probability that the process will continue indefinitely, thus creat-
ing a giant component. Otherwise, with probability 1−O(1/n2) we will create a component
with size smaller than k1 log n, so we can remove that component from the graph and then
repeatedly perform the process starting at a new vertex. After repeatedly performing this
process for some logarithmic number of times, we only remove O(log2 n) vertices from
the graph, which does not affect the constant y = Pr[T = ∞], so the probability that
we never end up with a giant component in every time is at most O(1/n). Therefore,
G(m,h, (1− )βn) contains a giant component with probability 1−O(1/n).
Remark: In the complete preference lists setting with αe−1/2α < (1 − )3/2, we have
c1 =
1−
α and c2 >
(1−)2
αe−1/α , which we still get c1c2 =
(1−)3
α2e−1/α > 1, which is a sufficient
condition to reach the same conclusion.
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